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A conference dedicated to exploring the future of unenumerated
rights stands to profit from a consideration of how this concept
evolved from a natural law background, and how it came to include
the right to follow ordinary trades and contractual freedom by the
end of the nineteenth century. Constitutional thought in the early
years of the American Republic was permeated with appeals to natu-
ral law and fundamental principles of justice. For our purposes, it is
especially noteworthy that there was a close affinity between such
pleas and high regard for the rights of property owners. This con-
nection, of course, reflected the tenets of English constitutionalism,
which had long treated property and liberty as interdependent con-
cepts. As John Phillip Reid has explained: "In the eighteenth-
century pantheon of British liberty there was no right more change-
less and timeless than the right to property."' Reid added:
There may have been no eighteenth-century educated American who
did not associate defense of liberty with defense of property. Like their
British contemporaries, Americans believed that just as private rights in
property could not exist without constitutional procedures, liberty could
2be lost if private rights in property were not protected.
It followed that the framers of the Constitution and Bill of Rights did
not differentiate between the right to own property and other per-
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sonal liberties. Indeed, property ownership was regarded as among
the most important rights!
I. NATURAL LAW TRADITION
Resorting to the natural law tradition had deep roots in the
American polity. Natural law theory, which stressed limitations on
governmental power, played a pivotal role in Revolutionary dis-
course.4 Thomas Jefferson wove natural law rhetoric into the Decla-
ration of Independence , claiming for the new nation a right to as-
sume "the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature
and of Nature's God entitle them. 6  In addition, he famously de-
clared the "self-evident" truth that individuals were "endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.,
7
State constitutions of the Revolutionary era made explicit refer-
ences to natural law. For example, the influential Virginia Bill of
Rights of 1776 asserted that all persons "have certain inherent rights,
of which... they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their pos-
terity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of
acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining hap-
piness and safety."8  Similarly, the New Hampshire Constitution of
1784 proclaimed: "All men have certain natural, essential, and in-
"3 See Walter Dellinger, The Indivisibility of Economic Rights and Personal Liberty, 2003-2004
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 9, 19 ("Economic rights, property rights, and personal rights have been
joined, appropriately, since the time of the founding.").
4 See KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW INAMERICAN HISTORY 58 (1989) ("Natural
law theory held that the positive law of a state, in order to be regarded as worthy of being
obeyed, had to embody or affirm certain eternal principles inherent in the structure of the uni-
verse."); 1 ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT 35-38 (7th ed. 1991) (describing natural law theory and its impact on pre-
revolutionary American political thought).
5 See KELLY ET AL., supra note 4, at 59-61 (excerpting and discussing the natural law pas-
sages of the Declaration of Independence).
6 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. I (U.S. 1776).
Id. at para. 2. Jefferson's use of the phrase "pursuit of Happiness" was in no sense a rejec-
tion of the central place of property rights in the constitutional order. See WILLI PAUL ADAMS,
THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE
CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 193 (Rita & Robert Kimber trans., Univ. of N.C.
Press 1980) (1973) ("[Tlhe acquisition of property and the pursuit of happiness were so closely
connected with each other in the minds of the founding generation that naming only one of
the two sufficed to evoke both."); I KELLY ET AL., supra note 4, at 60-61 ("Property and liberty
were thus inextricably related, and were considered necessary for the attainment of happiness.
It is inaccurate, therefore, to see in the Declaration of Independence a distinction between
property rights and human rights.").
8 VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § 1, reprinted in 7 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES,
AND COLONIES NOW AND HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 3813 (Francis
Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS].
[Vol. 8:5
Sept. 2006] EVOLFTION OF UNENUMERA TED ECONOMIC RIGHIS 919
herent rights; among which are-the enjoying and defending life and
liberty-acquiring, possessing and protecting property-and in a
word, of seeking and obtaining happiness."' Thus, a number of the
first state constitutions both stressed the importance of property and
recognized that property rights were founded upon natural law
norms. 0  It bears emphasis, moreover, that such constitutional lan-
guage went beyond the security of existing ownership patterns, and
affirmed the right to obtain property." Further, the text of these
documents suggests that the drafters were recognizing existing rights,
not fashioning new ones.
Recall also that many Federalists initially opposed a Bill of Rights
for the federal Constitution. Part of their concern was that a specifi-
cation of some rights was potentially dangerous. Federalists argued
that it was impossible to enumerate all rights, and that the omission
of other rights would imply that they did not exist. 2 James Wilson,
for example, insisted at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention:
In all societies, there are many powers and rights which cannot be par-
ticularly enumerated. A bill of rights annexed to a constitution is an
enumeration of the powers reserved. If we attempt an enumeration, every
thing that is not enumerated is presumed to be given. The consequence
9 N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. II, reprinted in 4 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 8, at 2453-54.
10 Virtually identical language affirming the natural right to acquire property appeared in
several other early constitutions. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1792, pmbl., reprinted in 1 FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 8, at 568 ("[A]I1 men have, by nature, the ights
of... acquiring and protecting reputation and property. .. ."); MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art.
I, reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 8, at 1889 ("All men are born
free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be
reckoned ... that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property .. "); PA. CONST. of 1776,
Declaration of Rights, § I, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 8, at
3082 ("That all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural, inherent
and inalienable rights, amongst which are... acquiring, possessing and protecting prop-
erty .... ); VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. 1, § 1, reprinted in 6 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, su-
pra note 8, at 3751 ("That all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain
natural, inherent and unalienable rights; amongst which are.. . acquiring, possessing and pro-
tecting property.... ."); VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 1, § I, reprinted in 6 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 8, at 3739 ("That all men are born equally free and independent,
and have certain natural, inherent and unalienable rights, amongst which are ... acquiring,
possessing and protecting property .... .").
1 See ADAMS, supra note 7, at 194 ("The first state constitutions thus clearly emphasized the
individual's claim to legal protection of his property. The self-imposed limits on sovereign
power that the constitutions articulated derived from a desire to guarantee not only freedom of
expression and of religious exercise but also the freedom to acquire property.").
12 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 263 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1966)
("[B]ills of fights ... are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution, but would even be
dangerous."); ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791, at 132-
143 (Bicentennial ed. 1991) (describing the controversy over a Bill of Rights during the debates
on ratifying the Constitution); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776-1787, at 536-540 (1969) (describing the conflict between the Federalists and the Antifed-
eralists over the inclusion of a Bill of Rights in the Constitution).
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is, that an imperfect enumeration would throw all implied power into the
scale of the government, and the rights of the people would be rendered
incomplete.
Likewise, James Iredell argued before the North Carolina ratifying
convention:
[I]t would be not only useless, but dangerous, to enumerate a number of
rights which are not intended to be given up; because it would be imply-
ing, in the strongest manner, that every right not included in the excep-
tion might be impaired by the government without usurpation; and it
would be impossible to enumerate every one. Let any one make what
collection or enumeration of rights he pleases, I will immediately men-
tion twenty or thirty more rights not contained in 
it.
14
James Madison made a similar argument to the Virginia ratifying
convention.'5 Many felt that it was safer to rely on lawmakers and
courts to respect natural rights. When it became apparent that this
argument would not prevail, the Federalists promised to support a
bill of rights in order to secure ratification of the Constitution."6 It
was in this context that the Ninth Amendment was born. As Madison
explained in discussing a precursor of the Ninth Amendment:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating par-
ticular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights
which were not placed in that enumeration; and it might follow, by im-
plication, that those rights which were not singled out were intended to
be assigned into the hands of the General Government, and were conse-
quently insecure. This is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever
heard urged against the admission of a bill of rights into this system; but,
I conceive, that it may be guarded against. I have attempted it, as en-
tlemen may see by turning to the last clause of the fourth resolution.
A number of scholars have concluded that the command of the
Ninth Amendment-"The enumeration in the Constitution, of cer-
tain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others re-
tained by the people"I8-was crafted to incorporate protection for
unenumerated rights.' 9 Randy E. Barnett has insisted that "both the
Is 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 436 (Jonathan Elliot ed., J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1901) (1836) [hereinafter
DEBATES].
4 4 DEBATES, supra note 13, at 167.
5 See 3 DEBATES, supra note 13, at 626 (saying that a bill of rights was both unnecessary and
dangerous "because an enumeration which is not complete is not safe").
See RUTLAND, supra note 12, at 159-89 (describing the compromise that led to the adop-
tion of the Bill of Rights).
17 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 456 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
t8 U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
19 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Introduction: James Madison's Ninth Amendment, in THE RIGHTS
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 1, 1-49
(Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989) (discussing this at length); Suzanna Sherry, The Ninth Amendment:
Righting an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1001, 1006-07 (1988) ("Judges and law-
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plain and original meanings of the Ninth Amendment require the
strict construction of any power that restricts the exercise of individ-
ual liberty, whether that liberty is enumerated or unenumerated.
'2
1
Courts, however, have paid little heed to the Ninth Amendment as a
basis for individual rights. ' But the Amendment is further evidence
of the importance of natural rights to the founding generation.
II. COURT DECISIONS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC
To be sure, there was uncertainty over the precise role of natural
law in the new constitutional order. Nearly everyone recognized that
individuals relinquished some of their natural rights when they en-
tered civil society. Moreover, there was a tendency for Americans to
conflate natural law with the traditional "rights of Englishmen" and
common law guarantees." Still other questions remained. Could the
precepts of natural law prevail over inconsistent positive law? Was it
appropriate forjudges, when positive law was silent, to go outside the
written text of constitutions and invoke fundamental principles not
expressly set forth in such documents? In other words, did written
constitutions supplement or replace natural law? Or was appropriate
use of natural law confined to illuminating judicial construction of
express constitutional and statutory provisions? Despite these uncer-
tainties, the notion that individuals possessed certain rights that pre-
dated government and positive law found repeated expression in
early American jurisprudence. Nonetheless, the place of natural law
in constitutional theory has been the subject of a prolonged contro-
versy, starting with the Supreme Court's 1798 decision in Calder v.
Bull.
23
An issue in Calder was the validity of an act by the Connecticut leg-
islature setting aside a decree in a probate case and directing a new
yers throughout the new nation shared a common belief that both written and unwritten rights
should be enforced by courts. The Ninth Amendment is itself merely further evidence of this
belief .. "); Eugene M. Van Loan, III, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment, 48 B.U. L. REV.
1, 24 (1968) ("[H]istorically the Ninth Amendment was intended to safeguard unenumerated
fundamental substantive rights... ."); see also BENNET' B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH
AMENDMENT: A CALL FOR LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS UNDER SOCIAL
CONDITIONS OF TODAY 19 (1955) ("The Ninth Amendment to the Constitution is a basic state-
ment of the inherent natural rights of the individual.").
20 RANDY E. BARNET[, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERT'Y
242 (2004).
21 But cf Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(using the Ninth Amendment as a basis for finding individual rights beyond those specifically
stated in the first eight amendments).
22 See REID, supra note 1, at 90-91 ("[N]atural law was equated with British constitutional law
and with English common law .... ).
23 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 378-88, 399 (1798) (discussing the legitimacy of invoking extra-
textual constitutional principles).
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hearing. The Connecticut Court of Errors upheld the grant of pro-
bate which resulted from the rehearing. The law was challenged be-
fore the Supreme Court as a violation of the constitutional provision
prohibiting states from enacting ex post facto laws. Although Justice
Samuel Chase sustained the actions of the Connecticut court, he as-
serted that legislative power was limited by fundamental principles
not explicitly set forth in the State's constitution:
I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a State Legislature, or that it is abso-
lute and without controul [sic]; although its authority should not be expressly
restrained by the Constitution, or fundamental law, of the State. The peo-
ple of the United States erected their Constitutions, or forms of govern-
ment, to establish justice, to promote the general welfare, to secure the
blessings of liberty; and to protect their persons and property from violence.
The purposes for which men enter into society will determine the nature
and terms of the social compact; and as they are the foundation of the legis-
lative power, they will decide what are the proper objects of it: The nature,
and ends of legislative power will limit the exercise of it. This fundamental
principle flows from the very nature of our free Republican governments,
that no man should be compelled to do what the laws do not require; nor
to refrain from acts which the law permit. There are acts which the Federal, or
State, Legislature cannot do, without exceeding their authority. There are
certain vital principles in our free Republican governments, which will de-
termine and over-rule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power;
as to authorize manifest injustice by positive law, or to take away that security
for personal liberty, or private property, for the protection whereof the gov-
ernment was established. An ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it
a law) contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be
24
considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.
In this often-cited language, Chase seemingly asserted authority to
strike down laws inconsistent with natural law. Justice James Iredell
concurred in the result, but expressed alarm over Chase's willingness
to invoke unenumerated rights. Iredell reasoned:
If, on the other hand, the Legislature of the Union, or the Legislature of
any member of the Union, shall pass a law, within the general scope of
their constitutional power, the Court cannot pronounce it to be void,
merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the principles of natu-
ral justice. The ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed stan-
dard: the ablest and the purest men have differed upon the subject; and
all that the Court could properly say, in such an event, would be, that the
Legislature (possessed of an equal right of opinion) had passed an act
24 Id. at 387-88. For an argument that Chase's views "were in the mainstream of late eight-
eenth century American jurisprudence," see Stephen B. Presser, Should a Supreme Coun Justice
Apply Natural Law?: Lessons from the Earliest Federal Judges, 5 BENCHMARK 103, 104-08 (1993). But
see WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEFJUSTICESHIPS OF
JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 236-38 (1995) (questioning whether Justice Chase meant
that natural-law principles provided an independent basis forjudicial review).
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which, in the opinion of the judges, was inconsistent with the abstract
principles of naturaIjustice. There are then but two lights, in which the
subject can be viewed: 1st. If the Legislature pursue the authority dele-
gated to them, their acts are valid. 2d. If they transgress the boundaries
of that authority, their acts are invalid. In the former case, they exercise
the discretion vested in them by the people, to whom alone they are re-
sponsible for the faithful discharge of their trust: but in the latter case,
they violate a fundamental law, which must be our guide, whenever we
21
are called upon as judges to determine the validity of a legislative act.
He indicated that the legislature could enact any law not inconsistent
with the written constitution.
The Chase-Iredell debate has resonated throughout American
constitutional history. Chase's views found immediate favor. As dis-
cussed below, both federal and state courts relied on the doctrine of
fundamental inherent rights to trim state legislative power in the
early decades of the nineteenth century. But Iredell also raised some
enduring points. Even if one accepts the existence of unenumerated
rights based on fundamental principles, difficult problems remain in
ascertaining which rights are protected against legislative interfer-
ence. Since inevitably people will answer this question differently,
the result may well be that at the end of the day the declaration of
unenumerated rights simply reflects the values of a particular court
majority. Iredell's warning is thus echoed by modern critics of the
concept of fundamental rights jurisprudence, who charge that this
doctrine circumvents majority rule and vests judges with virtually
boundless authority.
Justice William Paterson, who had been a leading member of the
constitutional convention, also considered the connection between
natural rights and property ownership in the well-known case of
Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance.2 6 The conflict originated in a dispute
over land claims in the Wyoming Valley of Pennsylvania. Paterson's
charge to the jury has the character of a philosophical address on the
nature of constitutional government. After making reference to the
Pennsylvania Constitution, Paterson broadly declared:
From these passages it is evident; that the right of acquiring and possess-
ing property, and having it protected, is one of the natural, inherent, and
unalienable rights of man. Men have a sense of property: Property is
necessary to their subsistence, and correspondent to their natural wants
and desires; its security was one of the objects, that induced them to
unite in society. No man would become a member of a community, in
which he could not enjoy the fruits of his honest labour and industry.
The preservation of property then is a primary object of the social com-
25 Calder, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 399 (Iredell,J., concurring).
26 2 U.S. (2 Dali.) 304 (1795).
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pact, and, by the late Constitution of Pennsylvania, was made a fundamen-
tal law.
Two points are noteworthy about Paterson's jury charge. First, the
Lockean overtones are clear. As one scholar explained, Paterson "re-
sorted to the Lockean idea of the social compact. 2 8 Second, Paterson
viewed the right to acquire property not only as a natural right but
also as one of the primary incentives for the formation of organized
society.
In the early decades of the nineteenth century prominent jurists
continued to invoke fundamental natural rights as a basis for consti-
tutional decisions, especially to protect property rights. 29 A few ex-
amples illustrate this practice. Several state courts relied on unwrit-
ten fundamental principles to require the payment of compensation
when private property was appropriated for public use in the absence
of a state constitutional provision.O The leading decision in this re-
spect was Gardner v. Trustees of Newburgh . In order to establish a wa-
ter supply, the Village of Newburgh planned to divert a stream away
from the plaintiffs farm. The governing statute made no mention of
compensation, and the landowner sued for an injunction to halt the
diversion. The New York Constitution did not contain a compensa-
tion requirement and the Fifth Amendment was not deemed appli-
cable to the states at that time. Acknowledging that a riparian owner
was entitled to utilize a watercourse flowing through his land, Chan-
cellor James Kent insisted that an owner could not be deprived of
property without compensation. He maintained that the payment of
compensation was "a necessary qualification accompanying the exer-
cise of legislative power, in taking private property for public uses; the
limitation is admitted by the soundest authorities, and is adopted by
all temperate and civilized governments, from a deep and universal
sense of its justice." 2 After pointing out that the written constitutions
of the federal government and several other states contained an ex-
press requirement for the payment of compensation, Kent added:
"Until, then, some provision be made for affording him compensa-
tion, it would be unjust, and contrary to the first principles of gov-
27 Id. at 310.
28 Leonard Boyne Rosenberg, The Political Thought of William Paterson 172 (Jan. 1967)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New School for Social Research).
2a) See generally Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 171, 182-222
(1992) (noting examples of fundamental rights jurisprudence in different states during the
early nineteenth century).
30 SeeJ.A.C. Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 WIS. L. REV.
67, 71-81 (1930-1931) (listing a series of cases in which principles of natural justice were in-
voked to require payment of compensation when property was appropriated).
31 2Johns. Ch. *162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816).
52 Id. at *166.
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ernment... to take from the plaintiff his undoubted and prescriptive
right to the use and enjoyment of the stream of water. ' ' 3 Likewise, in
1847 the Supreme Court of Georgia employed the language of natu-
ral law in analyzing the basis of the just compensation norm. The
court stated that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment "does
not create or declare any new principle of restriction ... but simply rec-
ognized the existence of a great common law principle, founded in
natural justice, especially applicable to all republican govern-
ments .... ', The court proceeded, in the absence of an express
compensation requirement in the state constitution, to insist that the
taking of property without just compensation would violate funda-
mental principles grounded on natural equity.
Other courts reached a similar result by blending principles of
natural law with written constitutional provisions. In Crenshaw v. Slate
River Co.35 the Court of Appeals of Virginia ruled that a river im-
provement statute unconstitutionally deprived mill owners of com-
pensation if mills were taken down in order to make the river naviga-
ble. judge Dabney Carr reasoned that "whether we judge this Law by
the principles of all Civilized Governments, by the Federal Constitu-
tion, or that of our own State, it is unconstitutional and void.
36
The early constitutional decisions of the Marshall Court also com-
bined appeals to natural law with invocation of explicit textual lan-
guage. It has been a topic of debate among historians whether the
Supreme Court under John Marshall's leadership resorted to natural
law simply to interpret the express text of the Constitution or as an
additional source of constitutional principles.1 7  Consider the am-
biguous basis of the decision in the famous case of Fletcher v. Peck," in
which the Court invalidated a Georgia statute that repealed an earlier
grant of land. Writing for the Court, Marshall voided the repeal act
because it violated "general principles which are common to our free
institutions" and the Contract Clause that barred state interference
with agreements. 9 Scholars cannot agree whether Marshall's refer-
33 Id. at *168. In his Commentaries Kent insisted that certain rights, including "the right to
acquire and enjoy property ... have been justly considered, and frequently declared, by the
people of this country, to be natural, inherent, and unalienable." 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES
ON AMERICAN LAW 1 (photo. reprint 1986) (New York, 0. Halsted 1827).
34 Young v. McKenzie, 3 Ga. 31, 44 (1847).
.5 27Va. (6 Rand.) 245 (1828).
36 Id. at 265.
37 SeeJames W. Ely, Jr., The Marshall Court and Property Rights: A Reappraisal, 33J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 1023, 1048-55 (2000) (analyzing this question and framing it in terms of whether the
Marshall Court was using natural law exclusively); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Con-
stitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127, 1167-76 (1987) (considering the Marshall Court's reliance on
natural law).
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
39 Id. at 139.
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ence to "general principles" just strengthened his reliance on the
Contract Clause or indicated that courts could invalidate laws con-
trary to fundamental principles of justice. Nevertheless, the Fletcher
opinion contains other language suggesting unwritten restrictions on
legislative power grounded in natural law. Marshall observed:
It may well be doubted whether the nature of society and of govern-
ment does not prescribe some limits to the legislative power; and, if any
be prescribed, where are they to be found, if the property of an individ-
ual, fairly and honestly acquired, may be seized without compensation.
To the legislature all legislative power is granted; but the question,
whether the act of transferring the property of an individual to the pub-
lic, be in the nature of the legislative power, is well worthy of serious re-
flection.40
One of Marshall's colleagues, Justice William Johnson, was more
explicit in resting decisions on extra-textual fundamental rights.
Concurring in Fletcher, Johnson emphasized that his opinion was not
based on the Contract Clause. Rather, he declared the Georgia re-
peal act void "on a general principle, on the reason and nature of
things: a principle which will impose laws even on the deity.'
1
Although later opinions by the Marshall Court tended to rely
more heavily on the written Constitution, the Justices never entirely
abandoned natural law as a source of fundamental rights. The lead-
ing case in which the Marshall Court looked to extra-textual princi-
ples to restrain legislative authority was Terrett v. Taylor.4  The case
grew out of an attempt by the Virginia legislature to seize and sell cer-
tain lands previously granted to the Episcopal Church. Justice Joseph
Story, speaking for the Court, invalidated Virginia's actions in an
opinion that did not reference any specific provision in the Constitu-
tion. Instead, Story repeatedly invoked notions of natural justice.
Denying that a legislative land grant was revocable, he insisted: "Such
a doctrine would uproot the very foundations of almost all the land
titles in Virginia, and is utterly inconsistent with a great and funda-
mental principle of republican government, the right of the citizens
to the free enjoyment of their property legally acquired." 3 Story also
questioned the validity of another act repealing a statute that incor-
porated Episcopal churches. In reaching this result, he again
pointed to unwritten rights:
But that the legislature can repeal statutes creating private corporations,
or confirming to them property already acquired under the faith of pre-
vious laws, and by such repeal can vest the property of such corporations
40 Id. at 135-36.
41 Id. at 143 (Johnson,J, concurring).
42 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815).
43 Id. at 50-51.
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exclusively in the state, or dispose of the same to such purposes as they
may please, without the consent or default of the corporators, we are not
prepared to admit; and we think ourselves standing upon the principles
of natural justice, upon the fundamental laws of every free government,
upon the spirit and the letter of the constitution of the United States,
and upon the decisions of most respectable judicial tribunals, in resisting
such a doctrine.44
In Terrett, Story clearly expounded his belief that land titles and cor-
porate charters were safeguarded by inherent principles of free gov-
ernment.
The Marshall Court continued to occasionally rely on natural law
concepts into the 1820s. In Wilkinson v. Leland 5 the Court showed its
willingness to give weight to unenumerated fundamental principles.
Although Justice Story, writing for the Court, rejected a challenge to
a Rhode Island law retroactively authorizing an executor to sell land
in the state to pay the debts of the deceased, he stressed that govern-
mental power over property was limited by natural justice:
That government can scarcely be deemed to be free, where the rights of
property are left solely dependent upon the will of a legislative body,
without any restraint. The fundamental maxims of a free government
seem to require, that the rights of personal liberty and private property
should be held sacred. At least no court of justice in this country would
be warranted in assuming, that the power to violate and disregard them;
a power so repugnant to the common principles of justice and civil lib-
erty, lurked under any general grant of legislative authority, or ought to
be implied from any general expressions of the will of the people. The
people ought not to be presumed to part with rights so vital to their secu-
rity and well being, without very strong and direct expressions of such an
intention. In Terret vs. Taylor, it was held by this Court, that a grant or
title to lands once made by the legislature to any person or corporation is
irrevocable, and cannot be re-assumed by any subsequent legislative act;
and that a different doctrine is utterly inconsistent with the great and
fundamental principle of a republican government, and with the right of
the citizens to the free enjoyment of their property lawfully acquired. We
know of no case, in which a legislative act to transfer the property of A. to
B. without his consent, has ever been held a constitutional exercise of
legislative power in any state in the union. On the contrary, it has been
constantly resisted as inconsistent with just principles, by every judicial
tribunal in which it has been attempted to be enforced. We are not pre-
pared therefore to admit that the people of Rhode Island have ever dele-
gated to their legislature the power to divest the vested rights of property,
. 46and transfer them without the assent of the parties.
44 Id. at 52.
45 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627 (1829).
46 Id. at 657-58 (internal citation omitted).
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Further, and of particular significance for this investigation, Marshall
himself maintained that property and contractual rights were based
on pre-existing natural rights, not state laws. In his only dissent in an
important case, Marshall declared:
that individuals do not derive from government their right to contract,
but bring that right with them into society; that obligation is not con-
ferred on contracts by positive law, but is intrinsic, and is conferred by
the act of the parties. This results from the right which every man retains
to acquire property, to dispose of that property according to his own
judgment, and to pledge himself for a future act. These rights are not
given by society but are brought into it.
4 7
Clearly natural law remained a component of Marshall Court consti-
tutional jurisprudence.0 To be sure, it was often convenient to link
appeals to natural justice with express language in the Constitution.
But this does not undercut the significance of reliance on fundamen-
tal principles as a buttress for economic rights.
The existence of unenumerated rights was also broached by Jus-
tice Bushrod Washington in Corfield v. Coryell, 49 the first case to ad-
dress the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, section 2 of
the Constitution. This provision was crafted to insure equality of
privileges between residents and non-residents in the same state, but
it did not define the "Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States. Washington, in often-quoted language, invoked ex-
tra-textual fundamental rights to determine the content of such privi-
leges:
We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges
and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong,
of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all
times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several states which compose
this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sov-
ereign. What these fundamental privileges are, it would perhaps be more
tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all compre-
hended under the following general heads: Protection by the govern-
ment; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and pos-
sess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and
safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may
47 Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 346 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting).
48 See Douglas W. Kmiec & John 0. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the Original
Understanding, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 537-38 (1987) ("Marshall argued that the right to
contract is a natural right protected by the Contract Clause; therefore, any law that interferes
with the right to contract, whether it operates prospectively or retrospectively, violates the
Clause.") (footnote omitted).
49 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
50 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
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justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.., to take, hold, and
51
dispose of property, either real or personal ....
This brief sketch of constitutional thought in the early decades of the
newly independent nation suggests two conclusions: 1) jurists were
prepared to invoke unenumerated rights, both to explicate constitu-
tional text and to provide a basis of decision absent a textual provi-
sion, and 2) the rights identified as fundamental were largely eco-
nomic in nature.
During the antebellum era state courts increasingly fused unenu-
merated rights with the concept of due process of law.52 Historians
have long debated whether the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, as well as their counterparts in state consti-
tutions, were intended to impose substantive restraints on govern-
ment. This contested issue will not be examined in detail here. It is
clear, however, that state courts before the Civil War began to inter-
pret due process as barring arbitrary deprivations of property.53 As
Earl M. Maltz has noted, "[a] substantial number of states.., also
imbued their respective Due Process Clauses with a substantive con-
tent.' '54 To decide which liberty and property interests were protected
by due process, courts not surprisingly looked to fundamental princi-
ples of natural justice.
III. RIGHT TO PURSUE A CALLING
Most of the early due process cases dealt with deprivations of
vested property interests, usually in land. Yet, as we have seen, prop-
erty was understood as encompassing the right to acquire economic
interests. We now turn to consider how the concept of due process
came to safeguard the practical steps necessary to obtain property-
the pursuit of lawful trades and the right to make contracts.
These emerging themes drew upon both the tenets of Revolution-
ary constitutionalism and currents of economic thought in England.
The theory of property rights articulated by the English philosopher
John Locke did much to shape thinking about the relationship be-
tween labor and property. In his Second Treatise of Government Locke
explained the origins of private property in terms of labor, observing:
51 Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551-52.
52 SeeJames W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive
Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315, 327-42 (1999) (discussing due process as a limit on legis-
latures during the antebellum era); see also Grant, supra note 30, at 82-83 ("[Some courts] deftly
blend [ed] the doctrines of natural law and due process.").
53 See, e.g., Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 385 (1856) (finding that prohibition law con-
stituted a deprivation of property without due process with respect to liquor already acquired).
54 Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
305, 317 (1988).
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yet every man has a property in his own person: this nobody has any
right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands,
we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the
state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour
with, and oined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his
property.
He also famously insisted that the very purpose of government was
the preservation of "lives, liberties, and estates. ' '56  Locke had an
enormous impact on constitutional thought. "By the late eighteenth
century," Pauline Maier has cogently noted, "'Lockean' ideas on gov-
ernment and revolution were accepted everywhere in America; they
seemed, in fact, a statement of principles built into English constitu-
tional tradition.0 7  The ideas of the Scottish political economist
Adam Smith, whose landmark treatise Wealth of Nations was published
in 1776, also had a strong appeal to Americans.58 A proponent of en-
trepreneurial freedom and market economy, Smith urged minimal
government oversight of economic activity. 59 In particular, he main-
tained that the matrix of property could be traced to labor, and he
was critical of restrictions on the ability of individuals to engage in
work. Smith asserted:
The property which every man has in his own labour, as it is the
original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and in-
violable. The patrimony of a poor man lies in the strength and dexterity
of his hands; and to hinder him from employing this strength and dex-
terity in what manner he thinks proper without injury to his neighbour, is
a plain violation of this most sacred property. It is a manifest encroach-
ment upon the just liberty both of the workman, and of those who might
be disposed to employ him.
60
Abridgement of the rights to follow ordinary callings or to acquire
property were early pictured in American constitutional dialogue as
destructive of liberty. A number of initial state constitutions banned
grants of monopoly. The North Carolina Constitution of 1776, for
55 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION
111-12 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690).
56 Id. at 155.
57 PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 87
(1997) (footnote omitted).
For a discussion of the affinity between Smith and the American Revolutionary leadership,
see JAMES L. HUSTON, SECURING THE FRUITS OF LABOR: THE AMERICAN CONCEPT OF WeVEALTH
DISTRIBUTION, 1765-1900, at 69-75 (1998).
59 See id. at 69-70 ("Smith and his successors explained how the 'invisible hand' of self-
interest in the marketplace produced general well-being in the economy and augmented na-
tional wealth.").
CA 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
137 (Edwin Cannan ed., Arlington House 1966) (1776); see also HUSTON, supra note 58, at 71
("[Smith] ... emphasized liberty, in particular the right of each person to seek employment in
accordance with his desires.").
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instance, proclaimed that monopolies "are contrary to the genius of a
free State, and ought not be allowed. 6 ' The Revolutionary Era aver-
sion to grants of exclusive economic privilege underscored a wide-
spread commitment to economic liberty and equality of opportunity.
In the same vein, four state conventions which ratified the proposed
federal constitution recommended an amendment banning monopo-
lies. The Massachusetts convention urged an amendment "[t]hat
Congress erect no company of merchants with exclusive advantages
of commerce. Reflecting this sentiment, in 1792 Madison stressed
the right of individuals to follow vocations of their choice. He de-
clared:
That is not a just government, nor is property secure under it, where
arbitrary restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies deny to part of its citi-
zens that free use of their faculties, and free choice of their occupations,
which not only constitute their property in the general sense of the word;
but are the means of acquiring property strictly so called.63
Madison recognized that the freedom to choose a line of work was es-
sential to improve one's economic circumstances.
John Marshall carried this line of thinking a step further. Dissent-
ing in Ogden v. Saunders, he argued that the Contract Clause should
be read to bar prospective as well as retrospective interference with
contractual arrangements.64  Marshall insisted that, if state laws gov-
erned contractual expectations, a legislative act "declaring that all
contracts should be subject to legislative control, and should be dis-
charged as the legislature might prescribe, would become a compo-
nent part of every contract . ,,"5 Under this analysis parties would
possess only those contractual rights that legislators decided to ac-
knowledge. Marshall could not win acceptance of his broad con-
struction of the Contract Clause, but his understanding of the fun-
61 N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, § XXIII, reprinted in 5 FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 8, at 2788; see also MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights,
§ XXXIX, reprinted in 3 FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 8, at 1690
("[M]onopolies are odious, contrary to the spirit of a free government, and the principles of
commerce; and ought not to be suffered.").
62 1 DEBATES, supra note 13, at 323.
63 JAMES MADISON, PROPERTY (Mar. 29, 1792), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION:
MAJOR THEMES 598, 598 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987); see also JENNIFER
NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE
MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 28-30 (1990) (stressing Madison's endorsement of
the right to acquire property).
64 See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 357 (1827) (Marshall, CJ., dissenting)
("It is also worthy of consideration, that those laws which had effected all that mischief the con-
stitution intended to prevent, were prospective as well as retrospective, in their opera-
tion .... There is the less reason for imputing to the Convention an intention, not manifested
by their language, to confine a restriction intended to guard against the recurrence of those
mischiefs, to retrospective legislation.").
65 Id. at 339.
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damental importance of contractual freedom found expression in the
due process norm after the Civil War.
6
The nascent notions of a right to work at lawful trades and to en-
ter contracts without legislative abridgement were strengthened by
the anti-slavery movement and the "free labor" ideology of the Civil
67War era. The idea of "free labor" powerfully distinguished the eco-
nomic system of the North from the slave labor of the southern states.
The core of the "free labor" ideology was that individuals could de-
cide where they would work, and on what terms. Seeking to impose
this concept on the defeated South, Congress treated the ability to
make contracts and acquire property as essential to the ability of for-
mer slaves to take part in the market economy."" The Civil Rights Act
of 1866, passed in reaction to the black codes in southern states, spe-
cifically included the rights "to make and enforce contracts" and to
gain property among the liberties guaranteed to freed persons. 69 The
Fourteenth Amendment was intended in part to eliminate questions
about the constitutionality of the 1866 Act and thus protect the eco-
nomic rights of former slaves.70  From its very inception, therefore,
there was an economic rights component to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.7' "No one who sat in Congress or in the state legislatures that
dealt with the Fourteenth Amendment," William E. Nelson observed,
"doubted that section one was designed to put to rest any doubt
about the power of the federal government to protect basic common
law rights of property and contract.
72
Thomas M. Cooley, the most influential constitutional theorist of
the late nineteenth century, reinforced the notion that liberty in-
cluded the right to follow a common occupation. In his seminal
work, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the Leg-
66 See BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 50
(1938) ("[Marshall's opinion in Ogden] might have given to the Court a power of supervision
over legislation under the contract clause comparable with that developed late in the century
under the Due Process Clause.").
67 See ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN
PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 11-39 (1970) (discussing free labor as the main focus of the Re-
publicans); William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age,
1985 WIs. L. REV. 767, 773-78 (describing the development of the free labor concept).
68 See HERMAN BELZ, EMANCIPATION AND EQUAL RIGHTS: POLITICS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM
IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 109-10 (1978) (detailing the work of Congress in protecting freed slaves
with regard to contract and property rights).
69 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866).
70 See WAILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 40-63 (1988) (describing the drafting and adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
71 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L. REV.
379, 394-98 (1988) (discussing the economic civil rights aspect of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment).
72 NELSON, supra note 70, at 163.
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islative Power of the States of the American Union, first published in 1868,
Cooley urged a substantive understanding of the due process norm.
He linked Jacksonian principles of equal rights and hostility towards
special economic privileges with due process protection, and main-
tained that the due process guarantee was to safeguard individuals
from the arbitrary exercise of governmental power.73 Stressing the
right to pursue lawful employment, Cooley declared: "The man or
the class forbidden the acquisition or enjoyment of property in the
manner permitted to the community at large would be deprived of
liberty in particulars of primary importance to his or their 'pursuit of
happiness.' 74 Cooley was instrumental in opening the door for a
broad reading of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
The contention that the Fourteenth Amendment safeguarded the
right of individuals to follow lawful callings without governmental in-
terference was first presented to the Supreme Court in the famous
Slaughter-House Cases in 1873. 7' A full consideration of this landmark
decision is outside the scope of the present inquiry. Briefly stated,
the case turned upon a challenge to the validity of a Louisiana statute
that granted the Crescent City Company the exclusive right to main-
tain a facility for butchering animals in and around New Orleans for
25 years.7 6 The statute prohibited all other persons from operating
slaughterhouses within the specified area. Louisiana defended the
measure as an exercise of the police power to protect public health
from unsanitary conditions.
John A. Campbell, a former member of the Supreme Court, ap-
peared as counsel for the individual butchers hurt by the monopoly
grant.7 7 He assailed the statute as a violation of both the Privileges or
Immunities Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Looking outside the text of the Amendment, Campbell
described the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
73 SeeJAMES W. ELYJR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 87 (2d ed. 1998) ("[Cooley's work] was instrumental in fashioning the
Due Process Clause into a substantive restraint on state power to regulate economic rights.");
HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA
POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 55-59 (1993) (describing Cooley's use of the Due Process
Clause as a limitation on arbitrary legislation).
74 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 393 (photo. reprint 1972)
(Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1868).
' 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
76 For the background of this case, see generally RONALD M. LABBE &JONATHAN LURIE, THE
SL4UGHTERHOUSE CASES: REGULATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
(2003) and Loren P. Beth, The Slaughter-House Cases-Revisited, 23 LA. L. REV. 487 (1963).
77 See ROBERT SAUNDERS,JR.,JOHN ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL, SOUTHERN MODERATE, 1811-1889,
at 214-20 (1997) (detailing Campbell's role in the Slaughter-House Cases).
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Amendment in terms of "the personal and civil rights which usage,
tradition, the habits of society, written law, and the common senti-
ments of people have recognized as forming the basis of the institu-
tions of the country."'78 Of greater long-range significance, Campbell
added that, in his view, the Louisiana law deprived the butchers of
property without due process of law. He reasoned:
The right to labor, the right to one's self physically and intellectually, and
to the product of one's own faculties, is past doubt property, and prop-
erty of a sacred kind. Yet this property is destroyed by the act; destroyed
not by due process of law, but by charter; a grant of privilege, of monop-
oly ....79
By a 5 to 4 vote, the Supreme Court rejected Campbell's argu-
ments and sustained the constitutionality of the grant of exclusive
privilege to the corporation. Speaking for the Court, Justice Samuel
F. Miller concluded that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
was to secure the rights of newly freed slaves against discrimination,
not enlarge protection for whites or other groups. 80 Distinguishing
between the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States
and those rights associated with state citizenship, Miller insisted that
the right to exercise a trade was not among the privileges of United
States citizens guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Hence,
the grant of a slaughterhouse monopoly was a matter for state gov-
ernance. Miller's opinion narrowly construed the protection af-
forded by the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the provision has subsequently received scant at-
tention from courts.
For our purposes, however, the most significant aspect of the
Slaughter-House Cases can be found in the dissenting opinions of jus-
tices Stephen J. Field"' and Joseph P. Bradley. The dissenters were
prepared to recognize a constitutional right to pursue a lawful call-
ing. Suggesting that the Privileges or Immunities Clause "refers to
78 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 55.
79 Id. at 56.
80 See MICHAEL A. Ross, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS: SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER AND THE
SUPREME COURT DURING THE CIVIL WAR ERA 189-210 (2003) (detailing the impact of the
Slaughter-House Cases on Supreme Courtjurisprudence).
8 See PAUL KENS, JUSTICE STEPHEN FIELD: SHAPING LIBERTY FROM THE GOLD RUSH TO THE
GILDED AGE 122-25 (1997) (discussing Field's dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases); NELSON,
supra note 70, at 156-58 (same); Forbath, supra note 67, at 778-82 (analyzing Field's dissent in
the context of the free labor ideology); see also BARNETT, supra note 20, at 203 (noting that the
dissenting opinions in the Slaughter-House Cases "understood the liberty to pursue an occupation
to be a fundamental right closely related to 'free labor'"); David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revi-
sionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1,
35 (stressing that the dissenting opinions of Field and Bradley "were laden with natural rights
rhetoric"); Wayne McCormack, Lochner, Liberty, Property, and Human Rights, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 432, 462 (2005) (declaring that dissenting opinions in the Slaughter-House Cases "were
full of natural law thinking").
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the natural and inalienable rights which belong to all citizens," 2 Field
relied upon the description of such privileges in Corfield case dis-
cussed above. He asserted:
The privileges and immunities designated are those which of right belong to
the citizens of all free governments. Clearly among these must be placed the
right to pursue a lawful employment in a lawful manner, without other
restraint than such as equally affects all persons."'
Maintaining that the Fourteenth Amendment provided a national
guarantee against hostile and discriminatory legislation, Field de-
clared: "All monopolies in any known trade or manufacture are an
invasion of these privileges, for they encroach upon the liberty of citi-
zens to acquire property and pursue happiness ... ,,8 5 Quoting Adam
Smith, Field concluded that the slaughterhouse monopoly violated
"the right of free labor, one of the most sacred and imprescriptible
rights of man. ..."8" As one scholar has aptly pointed out, "[n]atural
rights, then, not the language of the Constitution itself provided the
means by which Field would transform abstract justice into a tangible
constitutional guarantee. 8 7
Justice Bradley largely agreed with Field's analysis of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause. He explained:
This right to choose one's calling is an essential part of that liberty which
it is the object of government to protect; and a calling, when chosen, is a
man's property and right. Liberty and property are not protected where
these rights are arbitrarily assailed.
It followed that the legislative grant of a monopoly constituted an
invasion of the right of others to follow lawful trades. Additionally,
Justice Bradley found that the Louisiana statute deprived the butch-
ers of liberty and property in violation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. He pointed out:
[A] law which prohibits a large class of citizens from adopting a lawful
employment, or from following a lawful employment previously adopted,
does deprive them of liberty as well as property, without due process of
law. Their right of choice is a portion of their liberty; their occupation is
their property.89
Ultimately, of course, state and federal courts followed the path
marked by Bradley and invoked the Due Process Clause rather than
82 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 96 (Field,J., dissenting).
83 See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
84 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 97.
85 Id. at 101.
8 Id. at 110.
87 KENS, supra note 81, at 123.
88 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 116 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 122.
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the Privileges or Immunities Clause to oversee state economic regula-
tions and safeguard the right to follow a calling.90
In sync with the views of Field and Bradley, Cooley in 1879 ampli-
fied his affirmation of the freedom to follow ordinary avocations and
linked this right to the due process norm. He declared:
But if the constitution does no more than to provide that no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law, it
makes an important provision on this subject, because it is an important
part of civil liberty to have the right to follow all lawful employments....
The following of the ordinary and necessary employments of life is a mat-
ter of right, and cannot be made to depend upon the State's permission
or license Iexcept when] the business offers temptations to exceptional
abuse ....
In 1883 Cooley insisted:
The general rule undoubtedly is, that any person is at liberty to pur-
sue any lawful calling, and to do so in his own way, not encroaching upon
the rights of others. This general right cannot be taken 
away.92
Despite the outcome in Slaughter-House, it is noteworthy that the
Supreme Court was prepared to recognize unenumerated rights in
other contexts. At issue in Loan Ass'n v. Topeka was the validity of
municipal bonds issued to encourage the establishment of manufac-
turing enterprises. Holding that taxes could only be levied for "a
public purpose," the Court determined that the city could not impose
93taxes to pay for bonds to assist a private manufacturing concern.
The Constitution places no express restriction on the use of the tax
power, but Justice Miller, speaking for the Court, observed:
It must be conceded that there are such rights in every free govern-
ment beyond the control of the State. A government which recognized
no such rights, which held the lives, the liberty, and the property of its
citizens subject at all times to the absolute disposition and unlimited con-
trol of even the most democratic depository of power, is after all but a
despotism.
There are limitations on such power which grow out of the essential
nature of all free governments. Implied reservations of individual rights,
go See KEN 1. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES: DISCONTINUITIES IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 141 (2004) ("Slaughterhouse proved just the
beginning of a constitutional jurisprudence anchored in considerations of callings, property,
and labor.").
91 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE
INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 277-78 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1879).
92 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 745 (Boston, Little,
Brown, & Co., 5th ed. 1883).
93 Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 664 (1874) (invoking extra-constitutional
principle that the power of taxation is limited to "a public purpose").
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without which the social compact could not exist, and which are re-
spected by all governments entitled to the name.94
The Supreme Court revisited the New Orleans slaughterhouse
monopoly a decade later in Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co." In
1879, Louisiana adopted a new constitution which abrogated the
monopoly features in most corporate charters. New Orleans then
opened the right to engage in butchering to general competition.
The Crescent City Company alleged that these steps amounted to an
impairment of its corporate charter in violation of the Contract
Clause. The Justices unanimously turned aside this argument, but
Field and Bradley, in concurring opinions, reiterated their position
that the right to follow the common occupations was a fundamental
right. Invoking the Declaration of Independence and Adam Smith,
Field emphasized that the pursuit of ordinary trades was "a distin-
guishing privilege of citizens of the United States, and an essential
element of that freedom which they claim as their birthright., 96 Writ-
ing for three Justices, including John M. Harlan, Bradley again in-
sisted that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment had a broad meaning which encompassed the right to
follow common callings. He asserted that "the ordinary pursuits of
life, forming the large mass of industrial avocations" should be open
to all. A monopoly granted to a few "in any of these common call-
ings," he continued, was "necessarily an outrage upon the liberty of
the citizen .... .. More specifically, Bradley also repeated his conten-
tion that conferral of a monopoly which prohibited individuals from
pursuing their line of work deprived them of liberty and property
without due process.98
By the mid-1880s at least four members of the Supreme Court had
adopted the view that the Fourteenth Amendment protected the
right to follow a chosen avocation from state abridgement. But the
Court majority stopped short of affirming this principle. With recog-
nition of this right stymied at the federal level, much of the develop-
ment of the right to enter ordinary trades took place at the state level.
State courts began to evidence a more skeptical attitude toward regu-
94 Id. at 662-63. In reaching this conclusion Justice Miller relied on Cooley's work. See
COOLEY, supra note 74, at 487 (asserting that taxation has "for its only legitimate object the rais-
ing of money for public purposes and the proper needs of government"). See generally HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAw, 1836-1937, at 38-39 (1991) (discussing the "un-
written constitutional requirement that taxation could be only for a 'public use"'); NELSON, su-
pra note 70, at 169-70 (citingJustice Miller's doctrine-altering decision).
111 U.S. 746 (1884).
Id. at 757 (Field, J., concurring).
97 Id. at 763 (Bradley,J., concurring).
98 See id. at 765 ("[T he law which created the monopoly.. . did abridge the privileges of all
other citizens.., because [the trades in question] are among those ordinary pursuits and call-
ings which every citizen has a fight to follow....").
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lations that curtailed the right to pursue a trade. In 1878, the New
York Court of Appeals, for example, gravitated toward a comprehen-
sive reading of constitutionally protected liberty and property inter-
ests. The court declared that the due process guarantee of the state
constitution was not to be "construed in any narrow or technical
sense.":" The right to liberty, the Court observed, included "the right
to exercise his facilities and to follow a lawful avocation for the sup-
port of life. . . ."'00 Similarly, the concept of property was defined to
embrace "the right of property, the right to acquire possess and enjoy
it .... 01
V. OCCUPATIONAL FREEDOM ENDORSED
In 1885, the New York Court of Appeals, in the leading case of In
reJacobs,102 squarely embraced the view that liberty included the right
to pursue lawful callings. Because this ruling is the subject of a large
and contested literature, it warrants careful scrutiny. 0 3  Finding
tenement house cigarmakers difficult to organize, the cigarmakers'
union in the early 1880s agitated for legislation banning the manu-
facture of cigars in tenement houses.10 4 Such a measure was first en-
acted in 1883, outlawing the manufacture of cigars in any rooms used
as a dwelling in New York City. Significantly, the Board of Health
opposed the act, maintaining that the health of tenement workers
was not jeopardized by cigar-making. This law was declared unconsti-
tutional on grounds that the title did not properly express the subject
of the act.)' A revised law was enacted on May 12, 1884. Two days
Bertholfv. O'Reilly, 74 N.Y. 509, 515 (1878).
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 98 N.Y. *98 (1885) (holding that the Tenement House Cigar Act of 1884 was unconstitu-
tional and exceeded the scope of the state's use of its police power). For a discussion of Jacobs,
see GILLMAN, supra note 73, at 88-89 (describing the New York Court of Appeals decision ruling
that a law prohibiting Jacobs from rolling cigars in a residential apartment was unconstitu-
tional); Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549,
1579-81 (2003) (same).
103 Much of the historical debate turns on how one characterizes the trade of cigar manufac-
turing in tenement dwellings. Critics of the Jacobs decision picture such work as part of an ex-
ploitative sweatshop system, not independent labor in a free market. See Forbath, supra note 67,
at 795-96 (presenting the residential cigar-making of Jacobs as part of exploitation tactics by
landlords).
104 See 1 THE SAMUEL GOMPERS PAPERS: THE MAKING OFA UNION LEADER, 1850-86, at 356-58
(Stuart B. Kaufman ed., 1986) (praising the success of the Progressive Cigarmakers Union in
New York); Fred Rogers Fairchild, The Factory Legislation of the State of New York, 6 PUBL'N AM.
ECON. ASS'N 4, 11-21 (3d Ser. 1905) (explaining the movement of the organized cigarmakers of
the state in pushing legislation banning tenement-house manufacture of cigars).
105 See In re Paul, 94 N.Y. *497 (N.Y. 1884) (holding the first iteration of the act unconstitu-
tional under the New York Constitution because its title was insufficiently descriptive). The
Court of Appeals reserved for a future occasion "the question whether the act as a whole is
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later, likely based on a report by union investigators, Peter Jacobs was
arrested for making cigars in the tenement house apartment in which
he resided with his family. The Jacobs family occupied the first floor
of the tenement, comprising seven rooms. Jacobs used one room for
making cigars. Such activity was in violation of the 1884 state law,
which made it a misdemeanor to manufacture cigars in tenement
houses located in cities with a population of more than 500,000. The
law in effect banned cigarmaking in tenement houses in Brooklyn
and New York City, but not elsewhere in the state. Jacobs sought a
writ of habeas corpus.
The trial court dismissed the writ, andJacobs appealed to the Ap-
pellate Division.1 0 6 He was represented on the appeal by William M.
Evarts, a leading New York attorney and later a United States Sena-
tor.10 7  Evarts appeared as senior counsel for the New York Cigar
Manufacturers Association, an organization of manufacturing firms
that owned tenements in which workers produced cigars. Stressing
that the right to carry on lawful occupations in one's own residence
was a protected property interest, the Appellate Division observed:
[I]t may be stated as a legal and political axiom that since the great labor-
ing masses of our country have little or no property but their labor, and
the free right to employ it to their own best interests and advantage, it
must be considered that the constitutional inhibition against all invasions
of property without due process of law was as fully intended to embrace
and protect that property as any of the accumulations it may have gained.
It is not constitutionally competent, therefore, for the legislature to de-
prive by any arbitrary enactment a laborer in any lawful vocation of his
right to work and enjoy the fruits of his work in his own residence and in
his own way, except for the purposes of police or health regulations as
hereinafter considered. It is equally true also that when an artizan or la-
borer has rented a tenement for the residence of his family, with the
right to carry on his trade or occupation therein, he has thereby acquired
certain rights of property in the use and enjoyment of his tenement, of
which he cannot be deprived without due process of law. An arbitrary
within the police power of the State, and capable of being sustained under the Constitution."
Id. at *507-08. It is noteworthy that the prominent New York lawyer William M. Evarts ap-
peared on behalf of the appellant challenging the validity of the statute. Commenting on the
1883 measure, The New York Times expressed doubt that it was actually driven by health con-
cerns. See Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1883, at 4 (criticizing the measure as monopolistic).
106 In reJacobs, 2 Cow. Cr. 346 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1884).
107 See CHESTER L. BARROWS, WILLIAM M. EVARTS: LAWYER, DIPLOMAT, STATESMAN 425-26
(1941) (expounding the successful approach of Evarts in winning the Jacobs case). For addi-
tional discussion of the role of Evarts in the Jacobs case, see BENJAMIN R. TwISS, LAWYERS AND
THE CONSTITUTION: How LAISSEZ FAiRE CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT 99-108 (1942), stress-
ing the extent to which Evarts derived his argument from the dissenting opinions of Field and
Bradley in the Slaughter-House Cases.
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law for the mere purposes of such deprivation is absolutely dead at its
birth by force of the Constitution of the State."'
Finding that the measure was not a police power regulation to pre-
serve public health, the Appellate Division concluded that the statute
was unconstitutional and that the appellant should be released from
imprisonment.
The state pursued an appeal to the New York Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the Appellate Division. The court concluded that this
measure arbitrarily deprived Jacobs of both property and liberty
without due process of law. °9 It expressed concern that the statute
would compel the defendant to abandon carrying on the manufac-
ture of cigars in his home and to work for an employer in another lo-
cation: "He may choose to do his work where he can have the super-
vision of his family and their help, and such choice is denied him.
He may choose to work for himself rather than for a taskmaster, and
he is left without freedom of choice." ° The characterization of the
defendant's plight is likely a key to understanding this case. The
court pictured Jacobs, not as a victimized worker, but as an aspiring
entrepreneur hamstrung by an irrational regulation.
Emphasizing that a law which destroyed the value of property
might amount to a deprivation thereof even without a physical tak-
ing, the court found that the law interfered with the use of a tene-
ment house by an owner or tenant who was a cigarmaker. The right
to use the apartment was seen as a protected property interest. More
important for our purposes, the court defined liberty as not only
freedom from restraint but as the right "to earn his livelihood in any
lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or avocation." '' It fol-
lowed that any law which infringed these "fundamental rights of lib-
erty" was unconstitutional unless justified as an exercise of the police
power.112
The court next considered whether the law at issue was a measure
to promote public health. It took the position that judges must guard
fundamental rights against invasion on pretextual grounds:
Under the mere guise of police regulations, personal rights and private
property cannot be arbitrarily invaded, and the determination of the leg-
islature is not final or conclusive. If it passes an act ostensibly for the
public health, and thereby destroys or takes away the property of a citi-
108 See In reJacobs, 2 Cow. Cr. at 370. See also Notes, The New York Tenement House Cigar Act, 18
AM. L. REv. 1021, 1021 (1884) (summarizing the outcome of the Jacobs case).
109 In reJacobs, 98 N.Y. *98, *115 (N.Y 1885) ("[W]e have not been able to see in this law [a
relation to public health], and we must, therefore, pronounce it unconstitutional and void [as a
violation of due process].").
1o See id. at *104.
I d. at *106.
12 Id. at *107.
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zen, or interferes with his personal liberty, then it is for the courts to
scrutinize the act and see whether it really relates to and is convenient
and appropriate to promote the public health."s
The court found the public health rationale unpersuasive. First, the
court was not convinced that the manufacture of tobacco products
was injurious to health. Second, it pointed out that the statute was
not crafted to eliminate the supposed health hazard. The law did not
ban cigarmaking in factories and shops, or even in tenement houses
in other parts of the state. Lastly, the court expressed concern that
under the guise of public health the legislature might "have placed
under a similar ban the trade of a baker, of a tailor, of a shoemaker,
of a woodcarver, or of any other of the innocuous trades carried on
by artisans in their own homes.""
4
The court's skepticism about the health rationale supposedly be-
hind the tenement house cigar act was shared by many contemporary
observers. The New York Times, for example, opined in December of
1883:
The real question is whether cigar-making in tenement-houses is injuri-
ous to the public health in the sense that justifies an interference by the
State to prevent it, or whether the real object of the law is not to prevent
the competition of tenement-houses with the regular factories in cigar-
making.
After the Jacobs decision, the Times maintained that "the legislation
was really demanded by the trades unions, which desired to keep up a
supervision and control over all persons employed in making ci-
gars."1 1 6 In the same vein, the Albany Law Journal insisted:
In our opinion a more glaringly indefensible act was never passed under
the guise of a police measure. It was a reproach to our legislation that
such oppression could be exerted by the power of a few trade monopo-
lists."'
The Nation also applauded the court's ruling and attributed passage
of the tenement house cigar act to union pressure:
The act in question was alleged to be, and probably was, a trades-union
bill, favored by the workmen in the large manufactories in order that
their work might not be undersold. They painted a terrible picture of
the taskmasters who, to save a few pennies, turned small family living
apartments into reeking workshops. And they were to a certain extent
encouraged by the philanthropists of this city, who did not reflect that, as
this labor was better paid than most others and had fewer expenses, so
113 Id. at*110.
Id. at *114.
H11 Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1883, at 4.
16 Editorial, Three Important Decisions, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 21, 1885, at 4.
17 Current Topics, 31 ALB. L.J. 81, 82 (1885). See BARROWS, supra note 107, at 425, for a dis-
cussion of the union pressure to enact the ban on tenement cigarmaking.
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the tenements in which it was carried on belonged to the better class of
such houses. And further, that any such law would drive industry to
neighboring parts like Jersey City, where no such restrictions are im-
posed, and the sanitary arrangements are not so good as here. This sani-
tary question is of course the question at issue.18
It further expressed approval of the "broad view" taken by the court
with respect to "the special class [of] legislation of which there is now
so much on our statute-books."" 9
On the other hand, one prominent scholar offered a health justi-
fication for the measure. Christopher G. Tiedeman, generally a critic
of governmental regulation of business, asserted:
It can not be questioned that the State has the power to prohibit the
prosecution of all unwholesome or injurious trades and employments in
these large tenement houses in our metropolitan cities, in which the
people are often huddled together like cattle. The manufacture of cigars
is considered by some to so taint the atmosphere as to endanger the
health of the occupants of the house. If this be true, then the legislature
has undoubtedly the power to prohibit the prosecution of this trade in a
tenement house occupied by three or more families. The injurious effect
upon the health of the cigarmaker's family may not furnish the proper
justification for legislative interference, except in behalf of minor chil-
dren. For since the wife and grown children, in the theory of law, if not
in fact, voluntarily subject themselves to the unwholesome odors of to-
bacco, they do not need and cannot demand the protection of the law.
But where a house is occupied by more than one family, the other fami-
lies have a right to enjoy the possession of their parts of the house, free
from the unwholesome or disagreeable odors of a trade that is being
plied by another in the same house.
120
Another commentator agreed that there was "abundant evidence to
show that conditions in these tenement workshops were bad," but
concluded that "the stronger motive" behind the law was the desire of
the union to control the cigarmaking trade. 12 ' Historians can debate
what elements were foremost in securing passage of the tenement
house cigar act. The crucial point for this study is that there was
room for the court to fairly conclude that the ostensible health meas-
ure masked a legislative assault on the right to follow an ordinary call-
ing enacted at the behest of an economic interest group.
Some additional observations about Jacobs are in order. To but-
tress its conclusion that liberty included the pursuit of lawful trades,
the court quoted from the concurring opinions of Field and Bradley
118 This Week, 40 NATION,Jan. 29, 1885, at 85.
119 Id.
120 CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE
UNITED STATES CONSIDERED FROM BOTH A CIVIL AND CRIMINAL STANDPOINT 432 (photo. reprint
2001) (St. Louis, F.H. Thomas Law Book Co. 1886).
121 Fairchild, supra note 104, at 13.
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in Butchers' Union Co., treating these opinions as correct statements of
constitutional norms.'2 2 In Jacobs the court applied this doctrine of
occupational freedom in a context very different from the monopoly
setting in Slaughter-House. The decision in Jacobs clearly marked a
turning point. The right to follow a calling would find increased, but
never complete, judicial acceptance, and Jacobs would be widely cited
in the late nineteenth century.
Only months after Jacobs, the New York Court of Appeals invoked
the right to follow lawful pursuits to invalidate an anti-competitive re-
striction upon an entire line of work. A state law prohibiting the
manufacture and sale of oleomargarine as a substitute for butter or
cheese made from milk was challenged in People v. Marx.123 Citing Ja-
cobs, the court stressed "that it is one of the fundamental rights and
privileges of every American citizen to adopt and follow such lawful
industrial pursuit, not injurious to the community, as he may see
fit., 2 4 It concluded that this principle was breached "by an enact-
ment which absolutely prohibits an important branch of industry for
the sole reason that it competes with another, and may reduce the
price of an article of food for the human race.' 2' Harking back to
long-standing anti-monopoly concerns, the court pointed out that the
effect of this ban was to exclude one class of citizens from otherwise
lawful occupations in order to protect another class against competi-
tion.
A few years later the Supreme Court gave a cautious sanction to
the right to follow ordinary occupations. At issue in Powell v. Pennsyl-
vania was a state law prohibiting the manufacture and sale of oleo-
margarine. Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, brushed aside the
challenge to the law on Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Yet he re-
vealingly noted:
The main proposition advanced by the defendant is that his enjoy-
ment upon terms of equality with all others in similar circumstances of
the privilege of pursuing an ordinary calling or trade, and of acquiring,
holding, and selling property, is an essential part of his rights of liberty
and property, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The court
assents to this general proposition as embodying a sound principle of
constitutional law.
127
122 See In reJacobs, 98 N.Y. *98, *107 (N.Y. 1885) (quoting Field and Bradley at length).
123 99 N.Y. *377 (N.Y. 1885); see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Public Choice at the Dawn of the Special
Interest State: The Stoiy of Butter and Margarine, 77 CAL. L. REv. 83, 88-118 (1989) (providing an
illuminating discussion of the dairy lobby's campaign against oleomargarine and an analysis of
the Marx opinion).
124 Marx, 99 N.Y. at *386.
1'2 Id. at *387.
126 127 U.S. 678 (1888).
127 Id. at 684.
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Oddly, Harlan never discussed Marx. Dissenting, Field insisted that
the statute amounted to an arbitrary deprivation of liberty and prop-
erty in violation of due process. In reaching this conclusion, he
quoted the capacious definition of liberty in Jacobs and Marx, treating
the cases at length.
28
The right to pursue an ordinary calling steadily gained judicial so-
licitude at the state level toward the end of the nineteenth century. A
few examples must suffice. In State v. Moore, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina invalidated an emigrant agent law which placed a
prohibitory license fee on agents assisting southern blacks to find
employment outside the region. 29 The court quoted the language in
Jacobs affirming the right to pursue lawful trades, as well as the com-
ments of Justices Field and Bradley. 3 0 Likewise, the Supreme Court
of Illinois, in a line of cases, extolled the right to follow a calling. In
City of Chicago v. Netcher, for example, the Court invalidated a mu-
nicipal ordinance prohibiting department stores from selling meat
and food products as a deprivation of liberty and property without
due process of law. The Court fused the right to acquire property
with the freedom to follow a trade:
The liberty of the citizen includes the right to acquire property, to own
and use it, to buy and sell it. It is a necessary incident of the ownership of
property that the owner shall have a right to sell or barter it, and this
right is protected by the constitution as such an incident of ownership.
When an owner is deprived of the right to expose for sale and sell his
property, he is deprived of property, within the meaning of the constitu-
tion, by taking away one of the incidents of ownership. Liberty includes
the right to pursue such honest calling or avocation as the citizen may
choose, subject only to such restrictions as may be necessary for the pro-
tection of the public health, morals, safety, and welfare. The state, for
the purpose of public protection, may, in the proper exercise of the po-
lice power, impose restrictions and regulations; but the right to acquire
128 See id. at 692 (Field, J., dissenting) (quoting Marx as characterizing "liberty... to embrace
the right of man to be free in the enjoyment of the faculties with which he has been endowed
by his Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare" and not-
ing the holding in Jacobs that a health law may not arbitrarily interfere with personal liberty
without due process of law).
12 18 S.E. 342, 345 (N.C. 1893) ("[An 'emigrant agent' ... does not belong to that class
which is so inherently harmful or dangerous to the public that it may, either directly or indi-
rectly, be restricted or prohibited.").
0 Id. at 344 ("[Justice Field stated] that among the inalienable rights, as proclaimed in the
declaration of independence, is the right of men to pursue any lawful business or vocation in
any manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others."). See David E. Bernstein, The Law
and Economics of Post-Civil War Restrictions on Interstate Migration by African-Americans, 76 TEX. L.
REv. 781, 785 (1998), asserting that judicial protection of economic liberty sometimes assisted
blacks faced with discriminatory legislation, for an analysis of state regulation of emigrant
agents.
131 55 N.E. 707, 708 (Ill. 1899) (finding no health or safety rationale to justify the sales prohi-
bition by department stores).
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and dispose of property is subject only to that power. The individual may
pursue, without let or hindrance from any one, all such callings or pur-
suits as are innocent in themselves, and not injurious to the public.
These are fundamental rights of every person living under this govern-
132
ment.
Also, the New York Court of Appeals relied on Jacobs and Marx to
strike down a state statute outlawing the ticket brokerage business in
connection with railroad and ship transportation.1
3
3
This pattern continued in the early twentieth century. In Bessette
v. People, the Illinois Supreme Court struck down a law rejuiring a li-
cense in order to engage in the business of horseshoeing. ] Finding
no health or safety justification for the statute, the court held that the
measure abridged the right to pursue a trade. Similarly, the Supreme
Court of Tennessee, quoting from Jacobs, voided a municipal ordi-
nance providing that all city printing must carry the union label as a
deprivation of the right of non-union individuals to pursue ordinary
avocations. 13  Further, the Supreme Court of Nevada invalidated a
statute that prohibited individuals from engaging in the banking
business as a denial of the right to follow lawful occupations.
136
In Allgeyer v. Louisiana the Supreme Court forcefully endorsed the
proposition that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment safeguarded the right to follow common occupations. 137 Justice
Rufus W. Peckham, writing for the Court, famously declared:
The liberty mentioned in that amendment means not only the right of
the citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by
incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen
to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties, to be free to use them in
all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood by
any lawful calling, to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that
purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and
essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above
mentioned.
13 8
132 Id. at 708.
133 See People ex rel. v. Warden of City Prison of NewYork, 51 N.E. 1006, 1010 (N.Y. 1898) (de-
claring that state cannot abridge right to engage in ticket brokerage business).
134 See 62 N.E. 215, 219 (Ill. 1901) (noting that the state's police power did notjustify infring-
ing on the liberty of horseshoers); see also People v. Beattie, 89 N.Y.S. 193, 198 (N.Y. App. Div.
1904) (invalidating a horseshoe licensing requirement).
15 See Marshall & Bruce Co. v. Nashville, 71 S.W. 815, 817 (Tenn. 1902) ("This ordinance
deprives those not using the union label of the right of pursuing their business avocation, to the
extent that their bids for public printing will not be accepted.").
136 See Marymont v. Nev. St. Banking Bd., 111 P. 295, 303 (Nev. 1910) (holding that there
shall be no blanket denial to all individuals the right to engage in avocations which are benefi-
cial when conducted under proper regulations).
137 165 U.S. 578, 590 (1897) (citing Butchers' Union and Powell v. Pennsylvania to argue that
liberty includes the freedom to "follow any of the ordinary callings of life").
Id. at 589.
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By 1900 the right to pursue a calling seemed firmly established as a
component of liberty. 39 This development represented a vindication
of the views of Field and Bradley in Slaughter-House. In Truax v. Raich
the Court reaffirmed its commitment to the right to earn a liveli-
hood. Justice Charles Evans Hughes, speaking for the Court, invali-
dated a state law that limited the employment of aliens.14  He as-
serted: "It requires no argument to show that the right to work for a
living in the common occupations of the community is of the very es-
sence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the pur-
pose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure. ,141
One must be careful, of course, not to overstate the judicial en-
dorsement of occupational freedom as a constitutional norm. Dur-
ing the nineteenth century state legislators imposed licensure re-
quirements, often coupled with requirements of proper
qualifications, on many occupations, including architects, auction-
eers, barbers, peddlers, physicians, plumbers, and undertakers.
4
1
The spread of occupational licensing would, on its face, seem to be in
conflict with the right to pursue ordinary trades. 43 How could courts
decide which vocations were suitable for licensing, and which were
ordinary trades?144 Although occupational licensing produced con-
siderable litigation, state and federal courts sustained most schemes
against constitutional challenge.
145
1.9 See 1 CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL OF
PERSONS AND PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERED FROM BOTH A CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
STANDPOINT 236 (photo. reprint 1975) (1900) ("No man's liberty is safe, if the legislature can
deny him the right to engage in a harmless calling; there is certainly an interference with his
right to the pursuit of happiness in such a case; and such a prohibition would be a deprivation
of his liberty 'without due process of law."').
140 See 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915) ("[T]his admitted authority [under the police power] ... does
not go so far as to make it possible for the State to deny to lawful inhabitants, because of their
race or nationality, the ordinary means of earning a livelihood.").
141 Id. at 41.
142 See, e.g., ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
532-33 (1904) (citing examples of state legislatures using licensing as exercise of police power);
Lawrence M. Friedman, Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing 1890-1910: A Legal and
Social Study, 53 CAL. L. REV. 487, 494-502 (1965) (noting examples of occupational licensing
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
Cooley recognized the tension between license requirements and the pursuit of ordinary
callings. See Thomas M. Cooley, Limits to State Control of Private Business, PRINCETON REV., Jan.-
June 1878, at 233, 266-67 ("[A] free state has no power to compel the taking out of a license as
a condition precedent to the following of the ordinary pursuits of life.").
See TIEDEMAN, supra note 139, at 237 ("Whenever, therefore, the prosecution of a particu-
lar calling threatens damage to the public or to other individuals, it is a legitimate subject for
police regulation to the extent of preventing the evil. It is always within the discretion of the
legislature to institute such regulations when the proper case arises, and to determine upon the
character of the regulations. But it is a strictly judicial question, whether the trade or calling is
of such a nature, as to require orjustify police regulation.").
145 See Friedman, supra note 142, at 511-34 (listing various examples of courts sustaining oc-
cupational licensing laws).
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The Supreme Court heard few such cases, but in Dent v. West Vir-
ginia it upheld a measure governing the practice of medicine.4 ' Jus-
tice Field, a champion of the right to follow common callings, spoke
for the Court. He emphatically affirmed the right to pursue ordinary
vocations:
It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to fol-
low any lawful calling, business, or profession he may choose, subject only
to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex and
condition. This right may in many respects be considered as a distin-
guishing feature of our republican institutions. Here all vocations are
open to every one on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources of
livelihood, some requiring years of study and great learning for their suc-
cessful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the estate
acquired in them, that is, the right to continue their prosecution, is often
of great value to the possessors, and cannot be arbitrarily taken from
them, any more than their real or personal property can be thus taken.
1 47
Nonetheless, Field had no difficulty in finding that states could pro-
tect society by setting qualifications for physicians. To be sure, the
practice of medicine had long been viewed as a learned profession
rather than an ordinary trade 48 and so generalizations based on the
Dent opinion are difficult. But the Court in Dent, despite rhetoric
about the right to pursue ordinary callings, signaled its receptivity to
occupational licensing. Field made no attempt to reconcile his ear-
lier defense of occupational freedom, as exemplified by his Slaughter-
House dissent, with licensing requirements broadly.
As this record makes clear, the liberty to follow lawful callings did
not always prevail over employment regulations imposed by the
states. For our purposes, however, the crucial point is that state and
federal courts in the late nineteenth century articulated an unenu-
merated right to follow ordinary callings.
V. RISE OF LIBERTY OF CONTRACT
The growth of freedom of contract as a constitutional right was
linked to the right to pursue ordinary trades. Contractual freedom
had deep roots in American legal culture.49 Contracts were central to
146 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1888).
147 Id. at 121-22.
148 Cf HENRY W. FARNAM, CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF SOCIAL LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED
STATES TO 1860, at 84 (1st AMS ed., AMS Press 1970) (Clive Day ed., 1938) (treating attempts to
regulate physicians in late Colonial period). See generally FREUND, supra note 142, at 122 (dis-
cussing the qualifications of physicians).
149 See, e.g., MORTONJ. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 33 (1992) ("The institution of contract thus represented the legal
expression of free market principles, and every interference with the contract system ... was
treated as an attack on the very idea of the market as a natural and neutral institution for dis-
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the market economy and allowed individuals to bargain for their own
advantage. The prominent legal historian J. Willard Hurst empha-
sized "the overwhelming predominance of the law of contract in all of
its ramifications in the legal growth of the first seventy-five years of
the nineteenth century. "' Moreover, the emerging contract system
represented a move away from a hierarchical social order in which re-
lationships were governed by birth and status. Since private law in-
creasingly elevated the importance of contract law, it was only a short
step for courts to constitutionalize the right to make contracts in a
free market. Recall that Marshall, dissenting in Ogden, maintained
that the right to enter agreements was grounded in natural law which
pre-existed governments. Marshall did not carry the day in Ogden,
but his notion of the fundamental nature of contractual freedom
would powerfully reappear later in our constitutional history. As we
have previously discussed, the "free labor" ideology of the Civil War
era and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 underscored the right to make
contracts and acquire property.'
5'
Once courts recognized that the right of individuals to pursue
common occupations was constitutionally protected, the next logical
step was to uphold freedom of contract to achieve this end. The idea
that freedom of contract was protected against arbitrary state
abridgement was broadly endorsed as an element of state constitu-
tional law before the Supreme Court tackled the issue. Lawrence M.
Friedman aptly pointed out that "there were important forerunners
of Lochner on the state level. It was in the state supreme courts that
some important doctrines of constitutional law first saw the light of
day--doctrines of due process, or liberty of contract."
152
The Supreme Court first hinted its acceptance of a constitutional
right to enter contracts in Frisbie v. United States.'53 Justice David J.
Brewer, speaking for the Court, observed that "generally speaking,
among the inalienable rights of the citizen is that of the liberty of
contract, yet such liberty is not absolute and universal.' 54 He added
that "generally speaking, every citizen has a right freely to contract
tributing rewards."); James W. Ely, Jr., The Protection of Contractual Rights: A Tale of Two Constitu-
tional Provisions, I N.Y.U.J.L. & LIBERTY 370, 371-72 (2005) (illustrating the importance of con-
tracts in early American jurisprudence).
150 JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-
CENTURY UNITED STATES 10 (1956).
151 See generally Charles W. McCurdy, The Roots of "Liberty of Contract" Reconsidered: Major Prem-
ises in the Law of Employment, 1867-1937, 1984 SUP. CT. HIST. Soc'y Y.B. 20 (tracing liberty of
contract doctrine to the pervasive "free labor" ideology of the Civil War era).
152 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 25 (2002); see also Bern-
stein, supra note 81, at 42-44 (discussing emergence of liberty of contract doctrine).
153 157 U.S. 160, 165 (1895) (stating that the liberty of contract, while not an absolute right,
is one of the inalienable rights of citizens of the United States).
154 _
[Vol. 8:5
Sept. 2006] EVOLUTION OF UNENUMERA TED ECONOMIC RIGHTS 949
for the price of his labor, services, or property., 15 5  Significantly,
Brewer did not invoke the Due Process Clause or any express consti-
tutional language as a basis for these remarks. He appears to have re-
lied on the evolving view that contractual freedom was a fundamen-
tal, if unenumerated, right.
This development culminated in the Allgeyer decision. Giving an
expansive reading to liberty under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court affirmed freedom of contract as
well as the right to follow ordinary occupations. 56 Scholars have de-
bated how vigorously the Supreme Court actually applied the liberty
of contract doctrine to invalidate state regulations,1 57 but this inquiry
is outside the scope of this paper. All the same, courts viewed con-
tractual freedom as the constitutional baseline, and expected law-
makers to justify restrictions on this right 5' As Barnett explained, in
liberty of contract cases the Supreme Court "would not accept the
'mere assertion' by a legislature that a statute was necessary and
proper. Instead, it required a showing that a restriction of liberty
have a 'direct relation, as a means to an end,' and that 'the end itself
must be appropriate and legitimate."" 59
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF UNENUMERATED ECONOMIC RIGHTS FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
The existence of unenumerated economic rights have been of lit-
tle interest to jurists for decades. Only the most optimistic or fool-
hardy person would predict a revival of such rights in the near fu-
ture. 6  Indeed, the reality in current constitutional jurisprudence
153 Id. at 166.
156 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) ("The liberty mentioned [includes the
right] ... to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling.., and for that purpose to enter into all
contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to his [success].").
157 See Gregory S. Alexander, The Limits of Freedom of Contract in the Age of Laissez-Faire Constitu-
tionalism, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 103, 108 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999)
("[E]ven during the period between 1885 and 1930, the supposed height of laissez-faire consti-
tutionalism, the courts, federal and state, did not uniformly sustain the liberty of contract prin-
ciple."); Ely, supra note 149, at 387-93 (contending that the Supreme Court was not a consistent
defender of contractual freedom and rejected numerous challenges to state economic regula-
tions based on liberty of contract grounds).
See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 546 (1923) ("But freedom of contract
is ... the general rule and restraint the exception; and the exercise of legislative authority to
abridge it can be justified only by the existence of exceptional circumstances.").
1 BARNETT, supra note 20, at 214.
It should be noted, however, that some federal and state courts in the post-World War II
era have recognized a constitutionally protected right to pursue lawful callings. See, e.g., Cowan
v. Corley, 814 F.2d 223, 227 (5th Cir. 1987) (recognizing the right to pursue livelihood as a con-
stitutionally protected liberty interest); Santos v. City of Houston, 852 F. Supp. 601, 607 (S.D.
Tex. 1994) ("[T]he courts have consistently held that the opportunity to pursue one's liveli-
hood is a constitutionally protected liberty interest, which may not be arbitrarily denied."); State
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regarding economic rights is that courts do not even meaningfully
enforce the express provisions, such as the Contract Clause and the
Takings Clause, much less claims of unenumerated rights. Notwith-
standing this bleak assessment, I wish to briefly develop three points
that will hopefully facilitate a better understanding of the role of un-
enumerated rights in our constitutional past.
1) By 1900 there was broad agreement that courts could appro-
priately give effect to certain fundamental principles ofjustice even if
not spelled out in the federal or state constitutions. This was not a
license for courts to impose their view of desirable social or economic
policy on the public. Rather, courts were expected to enforce those
unenumerated rights deemed essential to a free society and deeply
grounded in the nation's history.
By the end of the nineteenth century, then, both federal and state
jurists widely believed that there were judicially-enforceable unenu-
merated rights, which were largely economic in character. This stress
upon property and contractual rights may be striking to modern eyes,
but courts defined liberty primarily in economic terms. As Stephen
A. Siegel has perceptively noted: "Civil liberties encompass both per-
sonal and property rights. Indeed, in nineteenth-century America,
property was considered among the most important civil liberties."''
The due process guarantee served to protect these fundamental eco-
nomic rights.16 2 There were differences, of course, over the extent of
such rights and what states must demonstrate to defend legislative in-
terference with them. It bears emphasis, however, that the debate
concerned the scope of the substantive rights guaranteed by due
process, not the notion later popularized by the Progressives and New
Dealers that due process merely referred to matters of procedure.1
6
3
v. Ballance, 51 S.E.2d 731, 736 (N.C. 1949) ("[A licensure requirement to practice the business
of photography] unreasonably obstructs the common right of all men to choose and follow one
of the ordinary lawful and harmless occupations of life as a means of livelihood .. ").
161 Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional Tradition, 70
N.C. L. REV. 1, 33 n.154 (1991). In the same footnote, Siegel commented that "lilt was not un-
til the twentieth century that legal scholars began to contrast civil liberties with economic liber-
ties." Id.
162 See Bernstein, supra note 81, at 37 ("By the time the Court decided Lochner, a virtual con-
sensus seems to have developed among the Justices that due process principles protected fun-
damental rights that were antecedent to government.").
163 See 2 LOUIS B. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BYJUDICIARY 374-96 (1932) (discussing the meaning
of the term "due process of law"); EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT:
A HISTORY OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 68-69 (photo. reprint 1970) (1934) (arguing that
"due process of law" pertains to trial procedures and does not limit legislatures); see also
HORWITZ, supra note 149, at 158 ("It was easy to confuse the controversial expansion of federal
judicial power under the Fourteenth Amendment with a supposed change in constitutional
methodology from 'procedural' to 'substantive' due process. That confusion was largely pro-
duced by later critical Progressive historians intent on delegitimating the Lochner court.");
Wayne McCormack, Economic Substantive Due Process and the Right of Livelihood, 82 KY. L.J. 397,
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There was no precise prescription for ascertaining which unspeci-
fied rights were essential to a free republican government. While a
number of provisions in the Constitution and Bill of Rights protect
against despoliation of economic interests, the concept of property is
not defined by the Constitution.1 6 4 Resorting to extra-textual princi-
ples was essential if the constitutional principles were to have any
meaning.1 6 5 Property was not understood as a static concept that just
protected existing economic arrangements. At least since the Revolu-
tionary era, the concept of property encompassed the right to acquire
property. How was a person to obtain property? In time, courts per-
ceived that the right to pursue lawful callings was a direct offshoot of
the right to acquire property. The next logical step was recognition
of the affinity between acquisition of property, following common oc-•P 166
cupations, and contractual freedom. As Peckham succinctly ex-
plained in Allgeyer, "[i] n the privilege of pursuing an ordinary calling
or trade and of acquiring, holding and selling property must be em-
braced the right to make all proper contracts in relation
thereto . ,, 7
Both the right to follow common avocations and the liberty to
make contracts were classic examples of unenumerated rights. To be
sure, they were founded on the proposition that property-expressly
protected by the Constitution-included the right to acquire prop-
erty. But ultimately they rested upon extra-textual ideas of funda-
mental rights deeply rooted in American history. In 1906 the Court
of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey explained the evolution of these
rights:
The common law has long recognized as a part of the boasted liberty of
the citizen the right of every man to freely engage in such lawful business
or occupation as he himself may choose, free from hindrance or obstruc-
tion by his fellow men, saving such as may result from the exercise of
equal or superior rights on their part, such, for instance, as the right of
fair competition in the like field of human effort, and saving, of course,
such other hindrance or obstruction as may be legally excused or justi-
fied. This right is declared by our Constitution to be unalienable. The
404 (1994) ("No recognized distinction between procedural and substantive due process ex-
isted until after the New Deal eliminated the substantive protections.").
164 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 889, 895
(2000) (discussing different ways to interpret property in the Constitution); Adam Mossoff,
What is Property?: Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 374-75 (2003) (highlight-
ing the continuing theoretical debates on the concept of property).
165 See Dellinger, supra note 3, at 13 ("[Elven the text of the Constitution contemplates the
enforcement of fights not specified in the text.").
166 SeeJames L. Kainen, The Historical Framework for Reviving Constitutional Protection for Property
and Contract Rights, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 87, 126-27 (1993) ("This expansion of [right to acquire
property] led directly to the Lochner era's protection of freedom of contract.").
167 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897).
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first section of the Bill of Rights sets forth that "all men are by nature free
and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights,
among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, ac-
quiring, possessing and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtain-
ing safety and happiness. As a part of the right of acquiring property
there resides in every man the right of making contracts for the purchase
and sale of property, and contracts for personal services which amount to
the purchase and sale of labor. It makes little difference whether the
right that underlies contracts of the latter sort is called a personal right
or a property right. It seems to us impossible to draw a distinction be-
tween a right of property and a right of acquiring property that will make
a disturbance of the latter right any less actionable than a disturbance of
the former. In a civilized community, which recognizes the right of pri-
vate property among its institutions, the notion is intolerable that a man
should be protected by the law in the enjoyment of property, once it is
acquired, but left unprotected by the law in his efforts to acquire it. 68
As historians well know, in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish Chief Justice
Hughes ruled that the due process guarantee did not protect con-
tractual freedom.' 69 He pointedly observed that "[t]he Constitution
does not speak of freedom of contract." v0 This somewhat glib obser-
vation is correct, but it does not markedly advance our understanding
of the place of unenumerated rights in constitutional jurisprudence.
The Constitution also does not mention privacy or dignity, but courts
have fashioned a jurisprudence of unenumerated rights based on
these concepts.17 So the observation by Hughes could be turned on
its head. As MichaelJ. Phillips tellingly asked:
On its face, liberty is a capacious word, one easily broad enough to in-
clude freedom of contract. By now, moreover, it has been read as includ-
ing the right to an abortion. If so nontraditional a right resides within
due process liberty, why should freedom of contract not dwell there as
well?
The answer to why unenumerated economic rights were singled out
for rejection is complex, and must be reserved for another day. But
168 Brennan v. United Hatters, Local No. 17, 65 A. 165, 170-71 (N.J. 1906).
16 300 U.S. 379, 391-93 (1937) (discussing the government's power to regulate contracts
under the Constitution).
170 Id. at 391.
171 See KERSCH, supra note 90, at 32 ("The value of 'privacy' itself was reimagined as being pro-
tected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which now guar-
anteed a 'right to privacy,' a right which came to be associated primarily with claims to sexual
and reproductive autonomy."). Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., sought to fashion a constitu-
tionaljurispnidence of human dignity. SeeWilliamJ. Brennan,Jr., Assoc. Justice, U.S. Sup. Ct.,
The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification (Oct. 12, 1985), in 19 U.C.
DAVis L. REV. 2, 8 (1985) ("iTlhe Constitution is a sublime oration on the dignity of
man. ...").
172 MICHAELJ. PHILLIPS, THE LOCHNERCOURT, MYTH AND REALITY: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
FROM THE 1890S TO THE 1930S, at 156-57 (2001).
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Phillips reminds us that the right to pursue callings and make con-
tracts can be traced far into the past, and have better historical
grounding than more recent claims of right that have found judicial
favor.
2) The unenumerated economic rights recognized during the
late nineteenth century-callings, contracting-were congruent with
the entrepreneurial ethic of the Gilded Age.' This symmetry under-
scores the fact that courts generally tend to reflect the values of the
dominant political coalition of the day. The prominence of unenu-
merated economic rights was entirely consistent with this rule. In
fact, courts of the late nineteenth century were championing values
broadly shared by Americans.
74
3) This account of the growth of unenumerated economic rights
flies directly in the face of the Progressive historiography. Progres-
sives, and later historians who reflect their views, have castjudicial so-
licitude for economic rights in a harsh light. They took particular
aim at the notion of unenumerated rights, picturing the rights to
pursue callings and make contracts as doctrines invented to assist
business interests and impose laissez-faire ideology. v5  Revisionist
scholarship has increasingly challenged, and to my mind largely de-
molished, the conventional wisdom that once dominated the litera-
ture. 1 76 This article provides additional ammunition for the revision-
ist camp. As the record makes clear, the right to acquire property
and aversion to state-sponsored monopoly were long-standing themes
in American constitutional thought. These notions in turn were
folded into the broader idea that the natural law tradition placed lim-
its on governmental power. By defending the right to pursue a call-
ing and the liberty of contract, courts were seeking to protect funda-
mental rights of individuals, not safeguard large corporations.
Justice Field, who was instrumental in promoting judicial affirma-
tion of the right to pursue a calling as well as contractual freedom,
exemplified this overriding concern with liberty. In Field's mind, his
jurisprudence was crafted to "give 'the under fellow a show in this
life."" 77 He was never a doctrinaire champion of business interests.
173 See ELY, supra note 73, at 82-100 (discussing the Supreme Court jurisprudence and popu-
lar sentiment of the era).
174 See JAMES W. ELY JR., THE CHIEFJUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888-1910, at 213
(1995) (maintaining that the Supreme Court under Fuller "shared the economic and social
views of the age and spoke for the dominant political alliance").
175 See, e.g., WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE
115 (1988) ("When the formalist approach to judging produced doctrines of substantive due
process and liberty of contract that sanctioned class oppression.... we justly suspect that the
formalist method was a cover for a hidden agenda.").
176 See Bernstein, supra note 81, at 5-13 (discussing revisionist scholarship).
177 Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some
Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61J. AMER. HIST. 970, 979 (1975).
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As Morton Keller has noted, "Field adhered to old American values of
private right and individual freedom that led him to be as ill at ease
with corporate power as he was with legislative activism. " 7s
VII. FINAL THOUGHT
It warrants investigation whether there is a close link between the
fundamental rights jurisprudence of the nineteenth century, focused
on economic rights, and the revival of unenumerated rights doctrine
starting in the 1960s. 7 9 Such a tie would perhaps not make champi-
ons of either economic rights or privacy rights entirely comfortable.
Indeed, a great deal of ink has been spilt by scholars seeking to dif-
ferentiate "bad" judicial enforcement of unenumerated economic
rights from "good" judicial solicitude for civil liberties."" This is all
the more reason for historians to rethink the question of continuity
in the development of unenumerated rights.
One could persuasively contend thatjudicial abandonment of un-
enumerated economic rights has produced unhappy results for other
individual liberties. Walter Dellinger has cogently maintained: "The
New Deal Court's elimination of any effective protection of economic
rights seriously weakened the bases for protecting personal liberty as
well.""
In this connection, it would be profitable to revisit the important,
if often overlooked, decision of Buchanan v. Warey.152 At issue was a
residential segregation ordinance which in effect barred blacks from
occupying homes in predominately white neighborhoods. Although
decided at a time when segregationist attitudes were dominant in
American society, the Supreme Court struck down the ordinance as a
deprivation of property without due process of law. In reaching this
result, the Court invoked a broad definition of property: "Property is
more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary that
178 MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA
367 (1977).
179 See Bernstein, supra note 81, at 52-58 ("For better or for worse, Griswold and Roe's protec-
tion of the unenumerated right to privacy raises many of the same issues as Lochners protection
of the unenumerated right to liberty of contract....").
[so See HORWITZ, supra note 149, at 247-68 (describing post-World War II thinkers' attempt to
reconcile judicial activism in review of civil liberties with judicial restraint in area of economic
regulation). See Morton J. Horwitz, The Jurisprudence of Brown and the Dilemmas of Liberalism, 14
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 599, 602-04 (1979), which stated that "[i]n some sense, all of American
constitutional law [recently] .. . has revolved around trying to justify the judicial role in Brown
while trying simultaneously to show that such a course will not lead to another Lochner era", for
a discussion of the dilemma of potential judicial activism posed by Brown.
181 Dellinger, supra note 3, at 16.
182 245 U.S. 60, 81-82 (1917) (finding that a law that banned African-Americans from resi-
dential property ownership was unconstitutional because of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause).
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it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it. The Constitu-
tion protects these essential attributes of property."'8 3 Combining
protection of individual property rights with regard for racial minori-
ties, Buchanan demonstrates that economic rights are concerned as
much with getting property as with safeguarding the interests of exist-
ing owners. It is of a piece, therefore, with earlier decisions recog-
nizing the right to pursue avocations or make contracts. It may also
be a bridge between two chapters in the evolution of fundamental
rights jurisprudence."5
"83 Id. at 74.
18 SeeJames w. Ely, Jr., Reflections on Buchanan v. Warley, Property Rights, and Race, 51 VAND.
L. REV. 953, 964 (1998) ("Buchanan forcefully demonstrates that regard for property rights is
not an end in itself, but is also important for securing individual autonomy and other personal
liberties.").
185 Consider the expansion of unenumerated rights under due process to civil liberties in
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (establishing the fundamental right of parents
and guardians to control the upbringing and education of their children) and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (finding that parents have a fundamental right to make de-
cisions about private school attendance). Although both of these decisions were based in part
on the protection of property interests, they contain broad language about personal freedoms.
See WILLIAM G. ROSS, FORGING NEW FREEDOMS: NATIVISM, EDUCATION, AND THE CONSTITUTION,
1917-1927, at 188 (1994) ("Taken together, the Court's vagueness about the economic liberties
that it was protecting and its robust language concerning human freedoms indicate that Meyer
and Pierce represent the application of a doctrine of substantive due process to personal liberties
that go beyond economic rights.").
